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“You Do Not Have To Say Anything”?
Preface
The Right to Silence
Contributor
Chaynee Hodgetts
The privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to silence, form foundation cornerstones of our common 
law heritage. However, over many years, the substance of 
the right to silence has arguably become eroded – most 
notably by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(CJPOA). This Act provided that, in some circumstances, 
adverse inferences may be drawn by the jury, from a 
defendant’s failure to mention any fact relied upon in their 
defence, when questioned under caution regarding (or, later 
charged with) a particular specified offence.
Many defendants may still, however, choose “no 
comment” as their sole statement, either under questioning, 
or at trial, or both. For some, this may be based on personal 
reasons, and for others, this may be based on legal advice. 
Nevertheless, the position of the defence practitioner faced 
with such a client may be difficult – the position in the 
latter instance being described by Lord Woolf CJ in Beckles 
[2005] 1 Cr App R 23 as: “singularly delicate,” and the 
situation with s.34 of CJPOA as: “a notorious minefield”.
This article aims to examine approaches that the defence 
practitioner may consider when faced with a steadfast “no 
comment” client. It is not aimed at those whose clients are 
in the position of deciding whether to comment – and, if a 
defence is to be argued, then this decision must be one for 
case-by-case contemplation. However, as the aim of this 
article is those practitioners whose clients wish to go “no 
comment,” those points are not relevant here.
Damned by Silence?
One of the main problems faced by defence practitioners 
with “no comment” clients is the risk that the jury may 
well draw adverse inferences from their silence. This 
fear is arguably amplified by the sanctity of the jurors’ 
deliberations – so it is not known whether such an 
inference has been a factor in the verdict, or not. This is a 
commonly-raised concern in commentary on miscarriage 
of justice cases involving “no comment” situations – 
one example being debate on this issue as a possible 
consideration in the Sam Hallam case (as discussed in C. 
Baksi, “Going ‘no comment’: a delicate balancing act,” 
Law Society Gazette, May 24, 2012). If a direction has been 
given, it remains impossible to know for certain whether 
one’s client has actually been affected by adverse inferences.
Noting the prevalent concerns regarding such potential 
adversity, there is a case to consider whether an assertion 
of “no comment” might actually harm one’s chance of 
acquittal with a jury. Though “no comment” remains a valid 
comment, broader contemplation of alternative options for 
jury trial may perhaps be worthwhile.
It may well be that a jury might presume one with an 
“innocent explanation” would elaborate the same at trial or 
interview – but the range and variety of clients for whom 
“no comment” may be used or advised is testimony itself 
as to the potential error of such a presumption. A client 
may well have sound, solid personal reasons for going “no 
comment” – which may be unconnected to the facts in 
issue, or even the case in question.
“Silence Plus Because”?
However, might there be an alternative to “no comment” 
which still preserves the sanctity of silence, but may find 
favour with a jury more easily than its predecessor? In 
attempting to begin the debates on this point, this article 
has considered a range of precedents, and psychological 
research, in order to propose early (and as yet untested) 
thoughts for further contemplation. It must be stressed that 
the contents of this article are as yet untested, academic, 
and used at the practitioner’s own risk.
That being said, for such a client area, this article 
develops the idea of “silence plus because”. This would be 
a very brief statement made, in careful and concise terms 
(potentially in writing), reserving the right to silence, and, 
briefly, setting out the client’s reasons for doing so (within 
precise parameters, such as privilege, to be discussed 
later). On the face of it, this notion may appear novel, if 
not counterintuitive to the general concept of not having 
to justify oneself. However, on deeper and more careful 
consideration, it may be something to think on.
Powers of Persuasion?
Research from the field of psychology has shown that, 
when people depart from certain social values, confusion 
and disappointment may result (G. R. Maio, J. M. Olson, 
L. Allen, and M. M. Bernard, “Addressing Discrepancies 
between Values and Behavior: The Motivating Effect of 
Reasons,” (2004) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
37, 104). Though not the subject of the study in question, 
this may potentially be extrapolated to the failure to 
comment. The findings of the researchers’ study may 
give some insight into gathering understanding of the 
jury for the defendant’s position of “no comment”. Their 
study focussed on others’ support for individual values 
(which may contradict social values) – and how support 
may be increased for the individual’s values. Their results 
supported the view that providing reasons for a value might 
convince others that the value has a rational basis, thus 
potentially explaining why such an action might be seen as 
sensible and justified. This could allow others (or, in a legal 
environment, a jury) a guide for the person’s behaviour (or 
choice to go “no comment”). Indeed, the study found that 
the personal nature of values may have effect even if the 
reasons are objectively weak.
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Similarly, another study (J-B. Légal, J. Chappé, V. 
Coiffard, A. Villiard-Forest, “Don’t you know that you 
want to trust me? Subliminal goal priming and persuasion,” 
(2012) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48, 358) 
demonstrated some evidence of increased agreement when 
reasons were given for requests, rather than the request 
made by itself – and this seemed so even when the reason 
given did not make sense. Thus there is some evidence from 
psychological research that the provision of reasons may 
be looked upon favourably by the public. Furthermore, 
this study suggested that those primed with the goal “to 
trust” showed more signs of evaluating messages linked 
to this, and sources of such, and appeared to exhibit more 
behaviour compatible with the message. Thus, it is possible 
that use of the word “trust” may be a thought for such an 
instance.
Overall, a client’s personal reasons for choosing “no 
comment” might thus be relevant? It appears that the field of 
persuasion in psychology may have great relevance to defence 
practitioners – but the legal position of any derogation from 
a planned “no comment” must always be carefully evaluated 
against the legal precedents present.
Protecting Privilege
It is important that a client, if relying on legal advice for 
not commenting, does not accidentally waive their legal 
professional privilege in attempting to seek a jury’s empathy 
for their reasoning. It was held in R. v. Derby Magistrates’ 
Court ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487, that the existence of legal 
professional privilege is essential. It was further confirmed 
that a defendant does not waive privilege by merely refusing 
to answer questions, based on legal advice. However, if 
they go beyond this and set out the grounds on which this 
advice was given, it may constitute a waiver of privilege 
(Bowden [1999] 2 Cr App R 176).
Thus, it is arguably very wise, if relying on personal 
reasons for silence, and legal advice to do the same, that 
the personal reasons for silence are brief, and distinct to, 
the basis of legal advice to remain silent – and that the 
grounds for such legal advice, or reasons for it, are not 
explained to the court, even if known to the defendant. 
Otherwise, this course of action runs the risk of being 
perilously close to an inadvertent waiver of privilege. 
It would be for the practitioner, on a case-by-case 
basis, to advise upon the potential use and wording of, 
and responsibility for, any such “silence plus because” 
statement.  
“Silence Plus Because” – Concept Under Construction?
The precise wording of a “silence plus because” statement is 
not yet conclusive, and, if developed, is something which 
would require further thought, and, possibly, individual 
wording for individual cases. It could be possible to provide 
a “double-barrelled” reasoning (and the potential reasons 
for doing so shall be explained later). Such a statement 
could potentially be along the lines of the following 
hypothetical example:
“I would like (to invite) you to trust and respect my 
choice to reserve my right to silence.
The reason(s) I wish to remain silent, maintaining that I 
am not guilty, but am innocent, is/are because:
1) Here would be individual’s suitable personal reason, 
or principle, or value, eg, a vow of confidentiality, or some 
other suitable reason.
And (if applicable);
2) I have been advised not to comment by my legal 
adviser/solicitor/barrister, am following their advice 
genuinely, I may not even be aware of the grounds of this, 
and, because of legal professional privilege, the grounds of 
this may not be lawfully questioned.”
There might also be the option for those wishing to 
elaborate with a defence to submit that this will be made 
by their legal adviser, solicitor, or counsel, or by written 
statement – but if a defence is to be argued, the sort of 
statement above may not always be appropriate?
Sensible Explanation For Silence?
In terms of either the “personal reasons” or legally 
privileged advice not to comment (or both), the client may 
have a case for a submission of adverse inferences not being 
drawn from silence. This is because, following the case of 
Condron [1997] 1 Cr App R 185, when being directed on 
s.34, CJPOA 1994, the jury should be advised that they 
may draw an adverse inference only where they are satisfied 
that the only sensible explanation for the defendant’s 
silence is that the defendant had no answer, or at least 
none that would stand up to scrutiny. The European Court 
of Human Rights affirmed (in Condron v. UK [2001] 31 
EHRR 1) that failure to give such advice may have art.6 
implications.
However, if the reasons given are the personal ones, or 
legal professionally privileged advice (or both, if distinctly 
set out) then arguably, the jury may have some explanation 
to contemplate in terms of Condron before concluding on 
the possibility of inferences. 
There remains, of course, no guarantee that they will not 
draw such inferences.
To conclude, it is hoped that the ideas in this article, 
while untested, (and practitioners would be responsible for 
their use, and any consequence) may provide some basis for 
further thoughts on the representation, reasons, and fair 
trial of “no comment” defendants in our criminal courts.
As Plato once observed: “Wise men talk because they 
have something to say; fools, because they have to say 
something.” 
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